Theories of legitimate regulation have emphasized the role of governments either in fixing market failures to promote greater efficiency, or in restricting the efficient functioning of markets in order to pursue public welfare goals. In either case, features of markets serve to justify regulatory intervention. I argue that this causal logic must sometimes be reversed. For certain areas of regulation, its function must be understood as making markets legitimate. Based on a comparative historical analysis of consumer lending in the United States and France, I argue that national differences in the regulation of consumer credit had their roots in the historical conditions by which the small loan sector came to be legitimized. Americans have supported a liberal regulation of credit because they have been taught that access to credit is welfare promoting. This perception emerged from an historical coalition between commercial banks and NGOs that promoted credit as the solution to a range of social ills. The French regulate credit tightly because they came to see credit as both economically risky and a source of reduced purchasing power. This attitude has its roots in the early postwar lending environment, in which loans were seen to be beneficial only if they were accompanied by strong government protections. These cases suggest that national differences in regulation may trace to historically contingent conditions under which markets are constructed as legitimate.
Introduction
Why do we regulate markets? Theories of regulation in the public interest have emphasized the role of governments either in fixing market failures to promote greater efficiency, or in restricting the efficient functioning of markets in order to pursue public welfare goals. 1 In either case, features of markets serve to justify regulatory intervention. I argue that this causal logic must sometimes be reversed; that, for certain areas of regulation, its function must be understood as making markets legitimate. 2 Based on a comparative historical study of consumer credit markets in the United States and France, I examine the sources of national regulatory divergence. In France, usury and data privacy laws restricted lenders' ability to offer credit to riskier borrowers. In the United States, a different set of regulations-including centralized credit rating, liberal pricing policies, and liberal bankruptcy provisions-promoted States. From the late 1980s, when consumer use of credit grew more common across Europe, the French company Cetelem emerged as the dominant player. 4 Consumer lending rates were also roughly the same in both countries. Given comparable know-how in originating consumer loans, and similar lending rates, why were American and French consumer credit markets so different? Figure 1 . Non-mortgage household debt in France and United States (share of disposable income), 3 From the late 1990s, households began rolling over consumer credit into home equity loans. The 33% figure includes 25% credit card and installment debt, plus an additional 8% of extracted equity used to pay off existing debt or make new consumer purchases. Alan Greenspan and James Kennedy, "Sources and Uses of Equity Extracted from Homes," Oxford Review of Economic Policy 24/1 (2008), pp 120-144. 4 In Note: Home equity extraction contribution to consumer spending and debt reduction estimated at 80% of total home equity extraction, assuming that 20% of extracted equity was shifted to other assets. France experienced no significant home equity extraction.
Using records from lenders and regulators, I argue that differences in credit practice derive from the ways in which consumer credit markets came to be legitimated in the two countries. In the United States, a coalition of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and commercial lenders helped to construct the market for consumer credit as a legitimate response to an evolving set of societal problems. Over the course of nearly a century, politicians on the left and right supported policies that promoted credit access as a form of social welfare. In
France, NGOs were less active and commercial banks stayed away from consumer lending.
Lending instead came to be dominated by dedicated consumer finance companies that were required to operate under close regulatory scrutiny. If American policies emphasized the value of This process of legitimation by regulation is not unique to consumer credit. Other market sectors, including life insurance and genetic technologies, have relied on regulatory interventions in order to shed prior public opprobrium. 5 If this legitimating function of regulation is pervasive, it suggests that the study of regulation might benefit from a strong dose of historical institutionalism. 6 Rather than focus on the functional logic of market failure or the welfare politics of market externalities, we might better explain existing national differences by studying the specific historical contexts in which new market sectors come to be perceived as legitimate in society. To the extent that different strategies of legitimation become locked in over time, historical institutions may play a critical role in explaining variation in contemporary regulatory outcomes. The article is organized as follows. The first section introduces the two cases that are to be compared. It presents two sets of theories that are commonly evoked to account for regulatory differences, then proposes an alternative theory based on the role of regulation in legitimating markets. The second section applies this alternative framework to explain patterns of consumer lending in the two countries. The third addresses sources of national differences in consumer credit rating. The final section traces the historical evolution of the link between credit and welfare in the two countries.
Existing Theories of Credit Regulation
The rise in consumer credit use across the advanced industrialized countries, together with a growing interest in institutions that promote credit access in developing countries, has focused academic attention on the sources of cross-national differences in credit use. Two kinds of explanations have dominated the debate. One sees credit markets as beset by problems of adverse selection that lead to an under-serving of risky borrowers. 7 This strain of research has emphasized the importance of information sharing among lenders to limit non-payment losses.
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Credit research has accordingly focused on credit rating agencies as a driver of credit extension, and on the use of credit data to select borrowers and set interest rates. 9 In micro-finance and other social lending institutions, social ties have been seen as an alternative means to overcome 7 Faced with a combination of honest-but-risky borrowers and dishonest borrowers who did not intend to repay, the latter group would be less price sensitive and thus over-represented among applicants. Joseph E. Stiglitz the industrial northeast that closed their doors during German occupation were able to collect on most of the debts after the war ended. And when the United States enacted a liberal consumer bankruptcy policy in 1978, including a provision for automatic discharge of debts, lenders appear not to have worried about its impact on non-payment rates, and raised no objections. Observers frequently but mistakenly attribute the high cost of consumer credit to the risk associated with unsecured personal loans, but the reality is more mundane. Consumer loans were expensive (25%-40% was typical in the early postwar period) primarily because of the unusually high administrative costs associated with writing, tracking, and collecting small loans. 12 The second kind of explanation focuses on the potential social costs associated with liberal credit access. The general proposal is that governments intervene in markets to manage an inherent trade-off between market efficiency and social equity. 13 In a range of markets, including labor, capital and product markets, governments regulate in order to curb the socially unacceptable externalities that unfettered markets would generate. 14 How much different states 8 are willing to compromise efficiency in order to promote equality depends in turn on institutional and political features that are distinctive to their political and historical context. 15 In consumer credit markets, the problem was that credit access appeared to be regressive in its consequences.
In general, the interest paid on outstanding credit reduces borrowers' purchasing power over time. But, because the administrative costs of making loans was high and fixed, smaller loans faced higher interest charges. To the extent that the working class and poor borrowed smaller amounts, they tended to reduce their purchasing power more. This effect implied that countries focused on the welfare of the poor and working classes should have an interest in regulation that limited credit access. Such regulation could take a variety of forms: usury ceilings, restrictions on downpayment and repayment periods, direct quantitative limits on extended credit, restriction on advertising and collections practices, limitations on data sharing and collections practices, and liberal bankruptcy provisions that weakened the contractual claims of lenders. Each of these regulations has been interpreted as limiting the supply of credit in order to limit the social costs of free credit markets.
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The problem with this efficiency-versus-equity argument as it relates to consumer credit markets is that neither American nor French policymakers believed that such a trade-off existed.
In the United States, policymakers on the left and right came increasingly to see consumer credit as supporting, rather than undermining, social welfare. In their view, more efficient consumer credit markets were welfare enhancing. In France, early postwar regulators restricted credit not primarily out of concerns about its distributional effects, but because they felt that consumer credit was an inefficient allocation of capital. France's restrictive policy with respect to consumer credit was grounded in the understanding that free markets offered neither welfare benefits nor efficiency. It is this cross-national difference in perception of the social and economic implications of consumer borrowing that needs to be explained.
The Puzzle: Explaining Demand for Credit
The adverse selection theory and the equity-versus-efficiency theory share a common focus on the supply side. Both assume a large, unmet demand for consumer credit, then focus on explaining differences in the degree to which that demand is being met. Yet a core puzzle of consumer credit is that demand for it exists at all. After all, consumer credit works over time to reduce household purchasing power. While borrowing allows a household to move its consumption forward in time, it also reduces its total consumption by the amount of the interest payments on the loan. Unlike business borrowing, in which debt creates a corresponding new stream of income out of which it can be repaid, household borrowing is a pure liability. 17 Interest payments must come out of the budget for future consumption. The effect is to reduce household purchasing power. Given this, why have households borrowed to finance consumption, and why has that borrowing increased over time?
Researchers have offered three explanations for this seemingly irrational behavior. The earliest explanation, formalized in the life-cycle savings model introduced by Franco Modigliani, suggested that credit could be used to could smooth consumption so as to increase overall 17 An estimated 30% of consumer credit actually finances business investment. Some small businesses rely on consumer loans to finance inventory and investments. They may devote household savings to business investments while financing consumption through credit. Educational borrowing is typically also understood as an investment. I am interested in household borrowing that finances pure consumption. household utility. 18 Assuming a diminishing marginal utility of consumption, households expecting a higher future income might borrow in order to move some of their consumption forward. The problem with the life-cycle theory is the very high cost of consumer borrowing.
Households would have to expect extraordinary wage growth in order for a typical 15%-20%
real interest rate to increase their household utility. Moreover, real wage growth had declined or even stagnated by the early 1980s, at the time when borrowing began to escalate. This pattern of wage growth and credit use is difficult to explain in terms of life-cycle consumption smoothing.
A second explanation has focused on the role of credit contracts in imposing discipline on households. 19 By contracting for a loan, households received a regular bill that bound their hands and forced them to pursue "systematic savings." 20 A third and related explanation focuses on the use of credit as a form of insurance. In this view, households faced with shocks to income and expenses used credit in order to maintain a minimum level of savings that they would need to carry themselves through hard times. The problem with both the discipline and the insurance arguments is that they no longer made sense once revolving credit had become the dominant form of unsecured consumer borrowing. Revolving accounts, which had by the 1960s become a dominant form of lending in the United States, gave consumers unusual flexibility in making repayments. This flexibility was attractive for lenders, who discovered that it allowed them to reduce non-payment rates, but it also eliminated the discipline of repayment for consumers. credit ceiling, customers had access to liquidity without actually borrowing. Had consumers been using credit as insurance, we would expect them to establish revolving credit accounts, and then hold them unused in preparation for future need. This was not the pattern that banks observed.
Without better explanations, economists have embraced the idea that borrowers behave irrationally. Studies of economic decision-making reveal that consumers possess a steep nearterm discount rate that leads them to prioritize current consumption. 21 This emphasis on nearterm consumption makes households accepting of even very high interest rates for short-term
loans. Yet the insight that consumers are short-sighted does not explain differences in policy that we observe across countries. Consumers also exhibit high demand for gambling, alcohol and drugs. How countries have responded to regulate their access to these markets has depended on the historical context in which they came to be regulated. 22 Even if consumers share an irrational short-term bias, the status of the market that serves that demand is set through the regulatory processes that need to be explained. By focusing on the role that national regulation plays in legitimating markets, I argue that we can begin to explain both the supply and demand for consumer credit. Formerly marginal economic activities had gained political and social legitimacy. How this transformation occurred, and the role of government regulation in the process, is central to understanding persistent national differences in credit practice.
In the United States, an evolving coalition of progressive social groups and business interests united around credit as socially advantageous. In the interwar period, legitimate consumer loans were promoted as an alternative to the scourge of high-rate salary lenders. In the early postwar period, both industrialists and organized labor supported credit as a means to drive scale in production, raising productivity, profits and wages. By the late 1960s, a new coalition had emerged that saw credit as a tool for extending economic citizenship to formerly excluded groups, including women and urban blacks. These ideas would influence the 'third-way' politics that promoted credit access during the 1980s and 1990s. Whether or not they were right, American interest groups on the left and right came together around the idea that credit access was a tool for social and economic equality. In France, this coalition of social progressives and business leaders never emerged. Labor unions argued that the interest paid on loans lowered worker purchasing power; economic planners warned that credit would drive inflation and hurt exports; commercial banks saw consumer lending as undignified and unprofitable. The was critical. In France, the interest of certain family associations in increasing access to credit was offset by objections from both religious groups on the right and organized labor on the left.
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In the United States, by contrast, a range of NGOs across the political spectrum organized to advocate for credit extension as a tool for economic self-reliance and social inclusion. closely with lenders to mitigate its potentially negative societal impact. These different approaches to credit would in turn affect consumer perceptions of the value of credit. American consumers were taught that consumer credit would improve their economic status, and their high level of borrowing reflected that belief. French consumers were taught a different lesson. For them, consumer credit was acceptable but risky-more akin to gambling than to an investment in future prosperity. French consumers borrowed, but they also supported government policies that placed careful restrictions on the scope and extent of lending practice.
Explaining Lender Behavior: Seeking and Finding Legitimacy
The central fact of early postwar consumer credit was that it was largely unprofitable.
The problem had little to do with the riskiness of individual borrowers, as later theories of adverse selection would suggest. In fact, most early consumer credit was working class credit, and the regular wage of workers made them reliable repayers. Small lenders did take pains to 15 reduce non-payment rates. In the United States, consumer lenders found ways to control nonpayment risk even before local credit bureaus became common in the 1940s and 1950s. Early
Morris Plan banks that pioneered unsecured small lending in the 1910s and 1920s required that each borrower be joined by two co-makers. 23 French postwar retail lenders employed either door-to-door collections, or relied on the judgment of retailers who were familiar with their customers. In most cases, non-payment rates remained below 1%.
The high cost of consumer credit derived mainly from the small size of each loan. For any lending transaction, the basic administrative cost-including loan application, credit check, bill mailings and reminders, and the associated bookkeeping-were largely invariant. This meant that small loans were relatively costly to administer, in proportion to the size of the loan. A study by France's National Credit Council in 1961 estimated that while the cost of an average commercial loan came 75% from interest and 25% from administration, the cost of an average consumer loan came 45% from interest and 55% from administration. 24 To earn a profit on small loans, banks had to charge high interest rates. In the United States in the 1910s, the Russell Sage Foundation estimated that lenders could not make loans "on a business-like basis" unless they were allowed to charge up to 42% annually (3.5% per month). By the 1960s, large lenders estimated that consumer loans below 18% could not be made profitably. The problem for banks was that they relied heavily on their reputations, and loans at such high rates were generally considered to be ethically questionable. In France, this moral economy of consumer lending led banks to steer clear. In fact, the French government periodically encouraged banks to enter the consumer lending field, in the hope that added competition would reduce consumer borrowing rates. In 1962, and again in 1972, banks dabbled with making personal loans, but quickly withdrew. Alongside concerns about reputation, France's commercial banks also discovered that they were unable to make small loans efficiently. Dedicated consumer finance companies in France had since the 1950s been investing in automation that allowed them to process small loans at relatively low cost. At Cetelem, a consumer lender formed in 1954, the staff-to-loans ratio had by the late 1970s reached 1:1,000, higher even than its American counterparts at the time. 25 Commercial banks, by contrast, were accustomed to making loans on the basis of personal relations with clients. These personal relationships imposed higher administrative costs, and yielded less reliable repayment.
Critically, French banks at the time were making strong returns on industrial lending in the The final ingredient that boosted both the supply and the reputation of credit in the United States was the role of retailers. Up until the 1950s, virtually every product and process innovation in consumer credit-including installment lending, the credit card itself, and the revolving credit account, plus automated equipment for making and collecting loans-had its roots in the retail sector. In the period of postwar prosperity, large retail chains like Sears, JC Penney and Montgomery Ward offered credit in order to increase sales. Initially, their credit activities were purely a tool for promoting merchandising. 32 The interest rates they charged, typically 1% per month, almost never covered the actual cost of credit, which had to be subsidized out of general revenue. It was only in the late 1970s that JC Penney and Montgomery
Ward began to make a profit on their credit services. Because the goal of early retail credit was to increase sales, retailers almost never pursued aggressive collections. Until the 1980s, JC Penney had a policy of writing off consumer debts more than six months past due. 33 It was in part the leniency of retail creditors that taught Americans to see consumer credit as economically benign. Retail credit was not accessible to everyone, but for customers whose applications were approved, they learned to see credit as convenient and non-threatening. 
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Historical Roots of Regulatory Divergence: Credit Rating and Data Privacy
The different roles of commercial banks in the United States and France had one final effect that, though unintended, would have a lasting impact on the institutional context of consumer lending. Much attention has been paid to the role of credit rating agencies in promoting access to consumer credit, and the French and American cases appear to affirm this link. 34 The United States had history of consumer credit bureaus dating to the interwar period, and the broad availability of credit in American has been attributed in part to the ability for lenders to use credit rating data to distinguish reliable from unreliable credit risk. 35 Conversely, the lack of centralized credit rating data in France has been described as one reason for the relatively low credit extension in the 1990s and 2000s. 36 French lenders shared only "black" nonpayment data, not positive "white" information about credit-relevant factors including assets, outstanding liabilities, income, and credit and employment history. Foreign lenders like Egg and Capital One reported staying out of the French market in the 1990s specifically because of the lack of useful credit rating data.
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In the United States, where tens of thousands of small lenders were offering credit, retailers and banks had long relied on chambers of commerce and other for-profit credit 34 Tullio Jappelli and Marco Pagano, "Information Sharing, Lending their own credit risk models, and using these models to guide direct marketing campaigns to attract new customers.
Why did France not develop a similar system of centralized credit reference data collection? The problem was not a lack of know-how. In 1900, the Parisian retailer and lender Georges Dufayel had already accumulated a credit database of over 3.5 million French citizensprobably the largest rating database of its kind in the world at that time. 39 Yet early postwar lenders never created a centralized credit rating bureau. There were two reasons for this. First, consumer lenders were relatively few in number. In 1955, France had 70 registered consumer lenders, and many of these were regionally focused. This meant that lender activities did not heavily overlap, and the advantages of sharing data were not great. More importantly, the way in which they assessed credit was different. In the French system, lenders made loans indirectly, through retailers, and those retailers took responsibility for assessing credit-worthiness of borrowers. When borrowers did not pay, retailers shared in the loss. If non-payment rates rose too high for a particular retailer, it was dropped from the lender's portfolio. The system was highly effective, and non-payment rates were regularly below 1%. But it meant that consumer lenders focused on repayment by retailers rather than by individual consumers. In 1974, the four largest consumer lenders in France did begin sharing non-payment data, but they never moved to share the sort of positive data that was used to assess borrower riskiness in the United States.
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In the 1980s, consumer lending in France shifted from indirect sales credit to direct-toconsumer lending. This shift in practice drove demand for a new credit data service. In 1988, the Banque de France advocated adopting a centralized "white" credit data depository to which all French lenders would contribute. Coming at a time when household debt and nonpayment rates were both rising, policymakers, as well as many consumer lenders, hoped that better data on household debt levels would help target loans to more reliable borrowers. 41 The project would almost certainly have passed, had it not been for objections from France's powerful data privacy agency, the National Commission in Information and Freedom (CNIL). CNIL argued that any centralized collection of private consumer credit data would unduly infringe on the consumers' right to privacy, and was therefore illegal under France's data privacy law. 42 Thus, France's lack of centralized credit rating would appear to reflect different national approaches to personal privacy.
In reality, the historical roots of data privacy policy the United States and France trace their roots to early postwar consumer lending practice. In 1968, authorities in both the United States and France were drafting legislation to introduce the principle of data privacy. The trigger in each case was an initiative to unify all government-held data into a single electronic database that could be used to optimize public policy. Consumer and labor advocates in both countries pushed for lawmakers to limit the collection and sharing of private data. The focus of the legislation was on the activities of the government, but each country also had to decide how to regulate data collection and sharing by companies. In the United States, data privacy legislation became the focus of intensive lobbying by the big-three credit rating agencies, which were in the midst of digitizing their collections. Coming at a time in which policymakers were pushing lenders to offer loans to traditionally marginalized borrowers, the credit rating agencies easily convinced policymakers that the collection and sharing of private credit data promoted fair credit access. US privacy legislation was therefore limited to government-held data. In France, there was no credit rating sector to push back against a comprehensive conception of data privacy that applied the same restrictions to private companies as to the government. Without opposition from the private sector, France's privacy legislation gave CNIL a broad mandate to regulate the exchange of private data among corporations. 43 In this way, the early structure of postwar lending in France set a legal trajectory that continued to shape the sector forty year later.
Explaining Demand for Credit: The Rise of Socially Acceptable Credit
Supply conditions alone cannot explain the different patterns of consumer credit use we observe in the United States and France; we also need to understand differences in demand. Both countries harbored deep traditional concerns about the impact of consumer credit on society. In France, the Catholic prohibition against usury, combined with a history of exploitative door-todoor textile traders that offered sales on credit, had given consumer lending a bad reputation.
This kind of apprehension was if anything stronger in the United States. The roots were partly religious, as in France, but also economic and social in emphasis. Almost every US state had strict usury laws on their books limiting interest rates to between 6% and 8% per year. Most were enacted in the wake of financial crises in the 18 th and 19 th centuries that had been attributed at least in part to credit-financed speculation. More generally, policymakers worried that consumer credit amplified the natural economic cycle, with liberal lending during periods of growth and scarcity during down cycles. By the turn of the 19 th century, social progressives and worker advocates had also become concerned about sales credit. Door-to-door sellers, discount retail chains (dubbed "Borax houses") and company stores all had the reputation of offering credit to induce their customers to purchase shoddy products. there were 40 similar institutions across the country. 47 They made loans at 1% per month, and raised capital by issuing bonds whose return was capped at 6% per year. The idea was to offer workers and the poor a low-cost alternative to loan sharks, and many of the country's charitable foundations invested in their bonds. For the many philanthropic industrialists who helped finance the effort, charitable pawn looked like a market-based alternative to the sort of expansive welfare states that were emerging in Europe.
The problem with charitable pawn was not that it didn't work-most were highly successful-but that it was not enough. Especially in the wake of the financial crisis of 1906-7, demand for credit was so high that charitable pawn could not keep pace. 48 50 The second innovation was based on some legal sleight of hand. For every $100 loan, Morris deducted $6 for interest and $2 as a processing fee. Although relatively cheap for lending at the time, this was still far above state usury laws, since the loan was repaid in weekly installments, and interest on the declining balance was closer to 13%. Morris's solution was to channel installment payments to the purchase of investment securities that were then used to repay the loan at the end of the term. Since the loan was not technically being repaid until the end, interest on the loan was 6%, and therefore below state usury caps. Morris justified the system as a tool for encouraging thrift.
Morris Plan borrowers learned to save, "in the first instance as a condition of a loan advanced by 49 As the NWRO campaign was coming to an end (repayment rates had proven disappointingly low), women's advocacy groups began to focus on credit access for white, middle-class women. The National Organization for Women (NOW) spearheaded a campaign to bring their plight into the light. As documented in thousands of testimonial letters, the greatest problems afflicted married and divorced women. Married women could only get credit in their husband's name; women's salaries were either not recognized or heavily discounted in home mortgage applications, on the grounds that they were likely to have kids and quit their jobs; many lenders requested so-called "baby letters" from doctors ensuring that a woman was infertile or on birth control. Once divorced, women had no credit rating of their own, and even professional women were unable to get credit. 59 The NOW campaigns led to further legislative reforms, including the 1974 Equal Credit Opportunity Act 60 banning discrimination based on sex or marital status, and an Amendment to the 1970 Fair Credit Reporting Act requiring credit agencies to keep separate records for married women. The message was clear: to be a functioning member of society required credit, and that meant that credit access must be treated as a right, not a privilege.
The French Case: Credit and Consumer Protection
The United States was by no means unique in interpreting credit as a strategy for improving social welfare. France had been experimenting with social credit long before it was discovered in the United States. Earliest of these was the charitable pawn shop, or mont-depiété. 61 The first mont-de-piété was opened in by the Franciscan monk Théophraste Renaudot in World War I, the monts-de-piété had functioned independently of the state. That changed with the onset of war. Under partial German occupation, non-payment rates rose, and the government placed a ban on auctions of unclaimed pawn. This drove the monts-de-piété into insolvency.
With the end of the war, and amid great social dislocation, the government began for the first time to offer direct financial aid to recapitalize the monts-de-piété. The effect was to make consumer lending a function of state welfare policy. Following World War II, the functions of the monts-de-piété were enlarged. They began offering low-cost salary loans to public employees, and, later, provided advances on welfare payments. In order to shed the social stigma that had traditionally been associated with the monts-de-piété, the institutions were rebranded as "municipal credit unions," and they continued to function as a part of France's formal welfare system. Credit could be beneficial, in some cases, but the conditions under which it was offered had to be carefully controlled.
The second difference in the French experience was a general hostility of organized labor toward credit. If American labor saw credit as a means to fight loan sharks, finance strike actions and secure the fruits of industrialization for workers, French labor leaders saw it as mainly negative in its effect. At a minimum, they complained that high interest charges on consumer contributed to the de-radicalization, or embourgeoisement, of the working class. 63 Leftist commentator René Creussol warned in 1956: "Employers hope that the need for regular repayment will cause workers to lose their combativeness and even, at the limit, their class consciousness, since they have to allocate a share of their salary at the end of each month toward paying their debts." 64 Concretely, he observed that workers with debts to pay were more reluctant to strike. France's communist party (CGT) was even most strident in its critique. For them, the interest paid on credit was simply another means to exploit workers once employers had reached the limits of wage restraint. "The challenges of increasing [worker] exploitation have made it necessary to resort to indirect means to recover salary payments." 65 With concerted opposition from labor, and with no other societal groups pushing actively for greater credit access, the idea of credit as socially progressive simply never took root.
Debates about consumer credit in postwar France instead focused on its implications for economic reconstruction. Officials at the Banque de France worried that free access to consumer credit would have two especially negative effects: that retailers would compete on providing credit rather than on price, resulting in inflation, and that consumer credit would reduce the capital available for industrial investments. 66 What is striking about each of these objections is that they had very little to do with concerns about individual welfare. Early consumer finance companies worked hard to address these concerns. They argued repeatedly that credit drove scale in production, and that this led to lower prices for consumers, while also helping French exports. 67 They also repeatedly argued that consumer credit encouraged savings. Their idea was that regular installment payments taught consumers discipline, and that they would continue to restrain their consumption even after the loan was paid off. Rather than crowding out industrial investment, French lenders argued that consumer credit would increase savings and thus make more capital available for industrial investment. 68 Cetelem, one of France's early generalpurpose sales finance companies, made this point clearly with their logo of a house depicted as a change bank, with a coin poised over a slot in the roof. Their case for consumer credit was not that it was good for workers or for the poor, but that it was good for France as a whole.
Conclusions
Market regulation has conventionally been justified in terms either of the public interest in correcting market failures or of the social welfare interest in restricting market functions. Each kind of account relies on features of markets to justify regulation. The case of consumer credit suggests that the historical context in which markets have been constructed as legitimate matters for the way in which they are regulated. For consumer credit, the goal of early regulation was to define a logic of consumer lending and borrowing that differentiated legitimate new practices from historically exploitative practices. The basis for that legitimacy proved to be very different in France and the United States, and those historical differences went on to shape the conditions of credit market regulation over the longer term.
Two features of the historical context proved consequential for the way in which credit came to be legitimated. The first was the role of banks. The core challenge of early consumer lending was not repayment risk-workers were in general reliable repayers-but instead the high administrative costs of making small loans. These costs, coupled with restrictions on how much lenders could charge, made consumer lending a largely unprofitable business. It was the fragmented and highly competitive banking sector in the United States that led banks to offer credit, and especially revolving credit, as an inducement to attract new depositors. American retailers also provided credit, subsidized out of sales, to attract new customers. And because the goal of these loans was to attract and retain customers, the terms of lending tended to be humane.
In France, banks were making profitable industrial loans to projects that were being supported through coordinated government policies. Despite periodic pressure from the state to enter the consumer lending business, most banks stayed away. Without the legitimacy that would have accompanied bank participation, French lending continued to be viewed with public skepticism.
The second feature that set France and the United States on different trajectories was the divergence in attitudes about credit of progressive non-government organizations, including trade unions and other welfare and rights groups. In France, the relationship between credit and welfare was contested. France was a pioneer with early forms of social credit, including charitable pawn, but these forays into credit-based welfare were managed directly by the French state. This lent consumer credit a limited sort of legitimacy: so long as it was carefully regulated, it could provide benefits, but those benefits did not automatically emerge with free credit access.
The labor left was generally opposed to consumer credit, which they saw as reducing worker purchasing power, and also potentially reducing worker militancy. Nor did other advocacy groups push credit access for socially marginalized groups. France's tradition of republican 37 citizenship implied equal treatment by the state, but not universal access to all products and services in the marketplace. In particular, the idea of "positive discrimination" in promoting market access was antithetical to the republican ideal.
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In the United States, an evolving coalition of lenders and non-profit societies pushed the idea of credit access as welfare improving: from anti-loan shark campaigns in the 1920s, to early postwar credit intended to give workers access to new household products, to campaigns in the 1970s to extend credit to urban blacks and middle-class women. The center-left "third way" movement of the 1990s continued to embrace expanded credit access as a means to improve the welfare of the worst-off in society. In a sense, it is hardly surprising that American consumers came to perceive consumer credit as a path to prosperity. For nearly three generations, coalitions of progressive activists and conservative industrialists assumed that access to credit generated positive social outcomes.
